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INTRODUCTION

Since its unveiling on October 28, 1980, Canada's National En-
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ergy Program 1 has been commented upon abundantly in govern-

ment circles, newpaper articles, trade magazines, and financial industry seminars, drawing both oil industry and foreign reactions.
It has received less notice in scholarly publications, however, perhaps because it is a complex and continuously changing program
that did not become effective until legislation was enacted.2
The purpose of this Article is to sketch a broad picture of the
National Energy Program (NEP) while focusing on its Canadi-

anization aspects, the new oil and gas taxation situation, and the
Program's various transnational law implications. As of September 1982, most of the National Energy Program has been enacted
by federal legislation.3
1.
CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Mmws, AND RESOURCES, THE NATIONAL
ENERGY PROGRAM 1980 (Report No. EP80/4E) (1980) [hereinafter cited as NEP].
2. It must be noted that the National Energy Program is not the result of
the one document that was tabled in the House of Commons on October 28,
1980, but, rather, of a plethora of documents including government declarations,
the 1980 budget papers, implementing legislation, agreements between the federal government and producing provinces such as Alberta, press releases, a subsequent 1981 budget speech, and an NEP UPDATE (Rep. No. EP82/4E) of May
31, 1982 [hereinafter cited as NEP UPDATE].
3. An Act to amend the Petro-Canada Act, ch. 105, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,
reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3121 (1982); An Act to amend the
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources Act, ch. 106, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,
reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3125 (1982); An Act to amend the
Petroleum Administration Act and to enact provisions related thereto, ch. 114,
1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3475 (1982);
An Act respecting petroleum incentives and Canadian ownership and control
determination and to amend the Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 107, 19801982 Can. Stat., reprintedin I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3131 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Petroleum Incentives Act]; An Act to amend the Canada Business
Corporations Act, ch. 115, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol.
6, no. 16, at 3527 (1982); An Act respecting energy monitoring and to amend the
Energy Supplies Emergency Act, 1979 and the Oil Substitution and Conservation Act, ch. 112, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprintedin I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16,
at 3435 (1982); An Act respecting motor vehicle fuel consumption standards, ch.
113, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in III Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3453
(1982); An Act to amend the National Energy Board Act (No. 3) ch. 116, 19801982 Can. Stat., reprintedin I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3537 (1982); Canada
Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6,
no. 12, at 2655 (1981); An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax,
ch. 48, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 7, at 1275
(1981); An Act to amend the Excise Tax Act and the Excise Act and to provide
for a revenue tax in respect of petroleum and gas, ch. 68, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,
reprinted in III Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 10, at 2457 (1981), amended by An Act to
amend the statute law relating to certain taxes, ch. 104, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,

304

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

A.

LAW

[VoL "16.'301

Overview of the National Energy Program

The National Energy Program accompanied the federal budget
of October 28, 1980. The objectives, or "precepts," were stated as
follows:
It must establish the basis for Canadians to seize control of their
own energy future through security of supply and ultimate independence from the world oil market.
It must offer to Canadians, all Canadians, the real opportunity to
participate in the energy industry in general and the petroleum industry in particular, and to share in the benefits of industry
expansion.
It must establish a petroleum pricing and revenue-sharing regime
that recognizes the requirement of fairness to all Canadians no
matter where they live.4
To attain these objectives, the National Energy Program made
the following proposals: (1) a "made in Canada" oil price system
that is "blended" to account for the different costs of domestic
and imported oil, and allows prices to rise to eighty-five percent
of the world or United States prices, whichever is lower; (2) the
financing of this price system through a "petroleum compensation
charge" levied on refiners; (3) a natural gas price system that increases gas prices less than oil prices but adds a new federal tax
on natural gas produced; (4) a new petroleum and gas revenue tax
(PGRT) of eight percent of production revenues computed without a deduction for royalties and expenses; (5) the phasing-out of
depletion allowances to be replaced by a new system of incentive
payments for oil and gas exploration and development (PIP
grants) although the beneficiaries of the PIP grants would not
necessarily be those who see their deductions phased out because
the payment scale favors Canadian-owned and controlled companies; (6) additional incentive payments for exploration on "Canada lands," which are lands under federal jurisdiction; (7) a new
Canadian ownership levy that will finance the takeover of foreignowned oil and gas companies by the Canadian Government or its
Crown corporations (such as Petro-Canada); and (8) a reserve to
the federal government of a twenty-five percent share on all oil
and gas plays in the Canada lands.5
reprinted in M Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3087 (1982).
4. NEP, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id.; see also Scarfe, The Federal Budget and Energy Program, October
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These aims would be achieved principally by the following legislative actions: (1) amendments to the Income Tax Act and to
the Income Tax Act Regulations governing resource taxation in
general, and depletion allowances in particular, as well as exploration and development expenses;6 (2) new federal taxes on oil and
gas; 7 (3) a new Canada Oil and Gas Act providing new rules for
exploration, development, and production of oil and gas on Canada lands; 8 (4) a new Petroleum Incentives Program Act along
with a new Determination of Canadian Ownership and Control
Act;" (5) a new Energy Monitoring Act and amendments to various other acts such as the Petroleum Administration Act, the
Petro-Canada Act, and the National Energy Board Act.10
Much of the original legislation was to be redrafted in light of
various policy changes and the agreement of September 1, 1981,
between the federal government and the Government of
Alberta.11
B. The Main Thrust of the NEP: Canadianization
Canadianization is arguably the principal purpose of the NEP.
In this regard, the NEP mentions three goals: 2 at minimum, fifty
percent Canadian ownership of oil and gas production by 1990;
Canadian control of a significant number of the larger oil and gas
firms; and an early increase in the share of the oil and gas sector
owned by the Government of Canada.
This apparently inoffensive statement contains rather devastating or spectacular proposals, depending upon one's point of view.
Everything in the NEP, from the incentive provisions and the tax
changes to the production rules for the Canada lands and the
price proposals, has Canadianization in mind. This is especially
true for exploration incentives structured to encourage invest28th, 1980: A Review, 7 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (1981) (from which this classification was inspired).
6. NEP, supra note 1, at 38-39; DEPARTMENT O FINANc E (CANADA), BUDGET
PAPERS 2 (Oct. 28, 1980) [hereinafter cited as BUDGET PAPERS].
7. NEP, supra note 1, at 35-38.
8.

Id. at 45-48.

9. Id. at 39-41.
10. Id.
11. Agreement relating to Energy Pricing and Taxation, Sept. 1, 1981, Canada-Alberta [hereinafter cited as Canada-Alberta Agreement], reprintedin 1982
CAN. ENERGY PROGRAm REP. (CCH) 75,101.
12. NEP, supra note 1, at 102-03.
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ment by Canadian corporations and individuals.1 3
This "rally around the flag" idea is misleading. The NEP favors
increased exploration on federal lands in northern Canada and in
offshore areas as well as increased revenues for the federal government, at the expense of exploration on provincial lands and of
the provincial share of resource revenues. It could therefore be
argued that Canadianization is but a facade and that the NEP is
designed to increase federal revenues.
The NEP's Canadian ownership provisions have met considerable criticism in various quarters, notably within the Reagan Administration in the United States.14 Though the issue is clouded
by the fact that the federal government also wants to wrest oil
and gas tax revenues from the producing provinces, it appears to
outsiders that the federal government, speaking for Canada,
wants to Canadianize the oil and gas industry by whatever means
it can use. Even though the federal government is only one level
of Canadian government, this political plan must not be underestimated because the federal government has the legal power to
enforce most of the program.
C.

The National Energy Program and the Canadian
Constitution

Although Canadian constitutional law on the distribution of
powers between the federal and provincial levels is far from
straightforward, various headings of the British North America
Act of 186715 (B.N.A. Act) would appear to enable the federal
Parliament to enact legislation such as that proposed by the National Energy Program. Indeed, provincial property rights to most
oil and gas resources within the boundaries of the provinces and
provincial legislative jurisdiction over exploration, development,
production, and conservation of these resources are not sufficient
to preclude a federal role in energy through the exercise of its
13. Id. at 39-41.
14. For a summary of the United States Administration's criticism, see U.S.CanadianEconomic Relations, 82 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 50, 50-55 (June 1982) (statement of Robert Hormats before the Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 10, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Hormats].
15. 30 Vict., 1867, ch. 3 (now renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, by Schedule I of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.)).
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taxation, trade and commerce, expropriation, and declaratory
powers. Also, the paramouncy (supremacy) rules usually can be
used successfully to ensure that in the case of overlapping valid
laws, federal legislation will prevail.""
Before the NEP, prices for oil and gas had been established by
agreement between the federal government and each producing
province. The NEP's unilateral attempt to fix prices caused considerable uproar and was met with a series of production cutbacks
by the Alberta government. After lengthy negotiations, the two
parties on September 1, 1981, reached an agreement with a struc7
ture that differs somewhat from that proposed in the NEP.
This incident shows that the two levels of the Canadian Federation must take part in energy decisions. Although the federal
Parliament may regulate crude oil prices through its combined
taxing and trade and commerce legislative powers, the B.N.A. Act
enables provinces to legislate on the exploration, production, sale,
and distribution of their natural resources within the province. 8
This shows that energy is a shared responsibility and that the
framers of the NEP considered this situation before tabling their
document. It is therefore submitted that the framers intended to
wrest power and revenues away from the provinces in the energy
field.
Similar comments could be made about the tax aspects of the
NEP. The proposed tax on exported natural gas and gas liquids
was challenged successfully on constitutional grounds first in the
Alberta Court of Appeal and then in the Supreme Court of Canada,19 though admittedly in a very narrow fact situation: the Alberta government was careful to ensure that section 125 of the
B.N.A. Act, which provides that no property belonging to a province would be liable to taxation, applied thoroughly. This plainly
indicates that the federal government must respect provincial political interests because of the divided jurisdiction that Canadian
federalism creates in the energy field.
This Article will not explore the constitutional aspects of the
16.

See P. HOGG, CONsTrrlUTONAL LAW OF

CANADA

101-14 (1977).

17. Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11.
18. For a critical discussion of the situation, see Magnet, ConstitutionalDistribution of Taxation Powers in Canada, 10 OTrAwA L. REv. 473 (1978).
19. Reference Re Questions set out in O.C. 1079/80, Concerning Tax Proposed by Parliament of Canada on Exported Natural Gas [1981] 3 W.W.R. 408
(Alta. C.A.), confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, June 23, 1982. 1982
N.R. 361 (June 23, 1982).
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NEP further because others have examined this question.2 0 Suffice it to say that legal and constitutional issues are compounded
by political issues stemming from the peculiar nature of Canadian
federalism.
II. THE

TAXATION PROVISIONS OF THE CANADIAN ENERGY
PROGRAM

A.

Oil and Gas Taxation in Canada

In Canada, corporate income is taxed by the federal government at the rate of forty-six percent.2 1 This rate is reduced by ten
percent to take into account the income taxes paid to the provinces. 22 Taxable income is income from all sources less the deduc-

tions permitted by the Income Tax Act.2 3 Oil and gas firms may
deduct exploration expenses, development expenses, the frontier
allowance, depletion allowances, a resource allowance, and capital
cost allowances. In reality, these deductions are tax incentives.
The main tax incentive is the deduction for Canadian exploration expenses. Oil and gas companies, and others who search for
oil and gas, can deduct from their income from all sources 100
percent of their Canadian exploration expenses. These expenses
include expenditures for geophysical and geological surveys, geochemical work, and test wells drilled to determine the existence,
extent, and location of petroleum or natural gas. Naturally, this
includes expenses incurred in drilling an oil or gas well or building a temporary access road. 4
20. See, e.g., R. Harrison, The Constitutional Context of Canada's National
Energy Program (April 8, 1981) (paper presented at the International Energy
Development Conference-Canada/U.S., Salt Lake City); A. Lucas, The October
28, 1980 Federal Budget and National Energy Program - Constitutional and
Regulatory Issues (Nov. 26, 1980) (paper presented at the Canadian Tax Foundation Conference, Montr6al). Another point of contention, well beyond the
scope of this Article, is the question of jurisdiction over the Canadian offshore
areas. For elaboration of the point, see Harrison, Jurisdiction over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of Confusion, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 469 (1979).
21. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972, Can. Stat. § 123.
22. Provinces may also provide rebates. For instance, Alberta legislation provides rebates against provincial income taxes equivalent to the payment of royalties to Alberta. Alberta Income Tax Act, ALTA. REV. STAT., ch. A-31, §§ 11-12
(1980); Alberta Corporate Income Tax Act, ALTA. REV. STAT., ch. A-17, § 26
(1980).
23. Ch. 63, 1970-1972, Can. Stat. § 3 (as amended).
24. See id.; see also Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. § 66.1(2),
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To qualify for an exploration expense, the well must be the first
well in a field not previously known to exist. This condition, however, is absolutely meaningless because a well drilled in a known
field that was not reasonably expected to come into production
within twelve months of completion is considered an exploratory
well. In light of the continuing natural gas surplus, nearly all natural gas wells qualify for the 100 percent deduction. Also, expenses incurred in Canada that result in a dry hole qualify for the
100 percent deduction. If the deduction is not needed, individuals
and corporations other than principal-business corporations may
carry it forward and deduct it in subsequent years.2 5
Canadian development expenses provide a second incentive. 26
These development expenses include expenditures for drilling oil
and gas wells that do not qualify for the exploration expense deduction and, until December 11, 1979, the cost of resource properties. These expenses may be deducted from income from any
source at the rate of thirty percent on a declining basis. This
means that almost all development expenses eventually would be
deducted. Again, development expenses incurred by individuals
and nonprincipal-business corporations may be carried forward
and deducted in subsequent taxation years.
A third incentive, the so-called super depletion or frontier allowance, was in effect from April 1, 1977, to March 31, 1980.28 A
considerable amount of money was committed to arctic drilling
partly because of the frontier allowance.2 9 If the cost of a well
exceeded five million dollars Canadian, then the excess cost would
generate a frontier exploration allowance of sixty-six and twothirds percent of excess costs deductible from income from any
source. Needless to say, this was in addition to the other deduc-

(3), (6)(a).
25.

See generally Watkins, Taxation of the Oil & Gas Industry, in

TAXATION

CANADIAN

823 (1981).

26. Income Tax Act § 66.2.
27. At that time a Canadian oil and gas property expense, deductible on a
10% declining rate, came into effect. See id. § 66.4(5)(a); see also Roche & Beil,
FederalIncome Taxation of the Resource Industries-The 1980-1981 Amendments, 29 CAN. TAX. J. 287, 289 (1981).
28. See Income Tax Regulations, Amendment, P.C. 1977-2471 (Aug. 31,
1977), reprinted in II Can. Gaz., vol. 111, no. 18, at 4215.
29. For instance, $58 million was raised from the public in 1978 by Beaufort
Exploration Limited under a tax shelter drilling fund featuring the frontier al-

lowance deduction. Financial Post (Toronto), Aug. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
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tions just mentioned. By adding the 100 percent exploration expenses deductions, the frontier exploration allowance permitted a
taxpayer to deduct 166% percent of the investment. In some
cases, therefore, the investment costs nothing. A high tax bracket
individual could make money on any investment-even a dry
hole.
A fourth incentive is the depletion allowance. This incentive is
interesting because it may be used in combination with other incentives. Each dollar incurred in Canadian exploration expense
and Canadian development expense enables the oil company or
individual taxpayer to earn a depletion base of thirty-three and
one-third percent of these expenses. A taxpayer with resource
profits may deduct the earned depletion base at the end of the
year or twenty-five percent of resource profits, whichever is less.30
This deduction may be carried forward and used in subsequent
years.
The resource allowance provides a fifth incentive. After 1976,
oil companies no longer could deduct from their federal tax liability royalties paid to the producing provinces. The federal Parliament then enacted a resource allowance-" to restore part of the
deduction for provincial royalties. Thus, in computing their income, oil companies deduct a resource allowance of twenty-five
percent of their resource profits.
Capital cost allowances constitute a sixth incentive. For instance, there is a thirty percent declining balance allowance for
machinery and equipment acquired for the purpose of exploring
for and producing oil and gas.2 An investment tax credit of seven
to twenty percent of eligible costs creates a seventh incentive. 33
Other incentives exist at the provincial level. The British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta provincial tax rebates, the Alberta royalty tax credit-which is called a small explorer's
credit-and the Alberta drilling incentives credit deserve note.3 '
Another interesting incentive permits an investor to borrow
30. Income Tax Regulations §§ 1201-1205.
31. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. § 20(1)(v.1); Income Tax
Regulations § 1210(1).
32. Income Tax Regulations, sched. II, class 10. Other classes provide for allowances relating to certain pipelines, storage tanks, gas processing plants, refin-

eries, and offshore drilling vessels.
33. Income Tax Act § 127(5), (9), (10).
34.

See generally E.

OF OIL AND GAS INcOME

HOLLAND,

G.

SCHULLI,

339-61 (1979).

& R.

KEMP, CANADIAN TAxATiON
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money and invest it in exploration programs, take all of the energy-related deductions, and deduct the interest expenses in35
curred to borrow the money.
These various tax incentives actually have stimulated exploratory drilling in Canada considerably. In fact, the number of exploratory wells rose from 1600 in 1975 to 3200 in 1978. The number of development wells rose in the same period from 2500 to
4000. Despite the huge losses for the federal and provincial treasuries, retention of these incentives in the 1980s was justified by
Canada's goal of energy self-sufficiency. Perhaps some adjustments should have been made, but this was a political question.
The pre-NEP incentives appeared to be sufficient to encourage
the pursuit of oil and gas, especially in light of increasing oil
prices. The NEP brought about a major change in the rules.
B.

Changes Made by the NEP
1.

The Structural Change

The National Energy Program proposed a major departure
from the previous system of federal incentives for oil and gas exploration and development provided through the income tax system. As mentioned in a 1981 document, the federal government
endeavors "to move away from this tax-based incentives system,
which was only of benefit to firms in a taxable position, to one
3 6
which delivers grants to firms directly.1
An earlier document puts the case more bluntly by saying that
"[t]he new incentive system ...
will facilitate the gradual
Canadianization of the oil and gas industry. This Program also
introduces a new element of fairness into the incentives system,
as the payments are not related to the tax status. .. .
Exploration and development expenses will now qualify for incentive payments instead of being treated solely by the income
tax system. Such incentive payments, however, will be available
only to firms with specific Canadian ownership and control. Payments will increase in proportion to the degree of Canadian own-

35. Income Tax Act § 20(1)(c).
36.

CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, THE PETRO-

LEUM INCENTrVES PROGRAM

37.

at vii (Rep. No. M 27-27/1981E) (1981).

CANADLAN. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, PETROLEUM
INCENTIVES PROGRAM: THE BASIC RULES-A FRAMEWORK 1 (1980).
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ership and control."
After a phasing out period, exploration and development expenses will no longer qualify for earned depletion, with the exception of expenses incurred for the exploration of federal lands by
corporations. Of course, the incentive payments reduce the exploration and development expenses that may be deducted under
the Income Tax Act.3 9
In sum, the NEP replaces the indirect incentives provided
through tax deductions with direct grants that discriminate
against non-Canadian firms. Nevertheless, the tax system remains
crucial and must continue to be examined in light of the NEP.
2.

Changes to the Existing Tax System
a.

Canadian exploration expenses

The NEP initially proposed a change in the definition of "Canadian exploration expense" to restrict considerably its scope after 1980.40 This would have changed many exploration expenses,
which were deductible at a 100 percent rate, into Canadian development expenses, which are deductible at a much less favorable
30 percent declining rate.4 1
Reaction to this proposal was swift.42 In response to this reaction, the bill that was introduced to enact this proposal postponed the change for one year and restored exploration expense
status to all costs incurred in dry holes and most frontier oil and
gas wells. 4'3 The budget of November 12, 1981, proposed that the
amendments would not go into effect until 1983."
Still, the exploration expense tax write-offs will be tightened
because costs for capped gas wells drilled in nonfrontier lands will
38. See NEP, supra note 1, at 39-41. This policy was implemented in Petroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, sec. 10.
39. See An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, sec. 34(13)
(amending § 66.1(6)(b) of the Income Tax Act).
40. See BUDGET PAPERS, supra note 6, at 90-91.
41. Income Tax Act § 66.2(2).
42. Because of this and other NEP measures, shares of Canadian oil and gas
firms listed on United States and Canadian stock exchanges plummeted, drilling
rigs started moving out of the country, and the industry set up a strong lobby.
43. See An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, sec. 34(10).
44. See DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (CANADA), BUDGET PAPERS 44-45 (Nov. 12,
1981) (this postponement has not yet been enacted). It is included, however, in a
comprehensive Notice of Ways and Means Motion, tabled in HOUSE OF COMMONS, sec. 34 (June 28, 1982).

19831

CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM

313

be treated as development expenses.4 5 Also, any grant received
under the Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP)46 will reduce the
amount of exploration expenses deductible. Exploration expenses,
therefore, will become a less important factor in investment decisions. Nevertheless, "non-COR companies" may decide not to
Canadianize, thereby forfeiting a good part of the potential PIP
grants. In such cases, the 100 percent tax write-off of the exploration expenses, although more restricted in scope than before, will
remain a very important factor. 7
b. Canadian development expenses
The National Energy Program expands the scope of development expenses to compensate for the new restrictions on exploration expenses. Bill C-54, which gives the new definition of exploration expenses,6 amends the definition of development expenses
slightly 9 but preserves the provision granting development expense status to expenses incurred for drilling or completing wells
that do not qualify as exploration expenses.50
Of course, any PIP grants received under the NEP will reduce
development expense deductions proportionately. 51 Thus, the development expense deduction becomes a less significant consideration in investment decisions unless the taxpayer fails to qualify
for PIP grants.
c. Depletion allowances
Changes in the Income Tax Act Regulations relating to depletion allowances support the NEP policy of replacing tax incen45.

See PRICE, WATERHOUSE &

Co., THE

NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM 18-19

(2d ed. 1981). This has been enacted in An Act to amend the statute law relating
to income tax, sec. 34(10).
46. Income Tax Act § 66.1(6)(b) amended by An Act to amend the statute
law relating to income tax, sec. 34(13).
47. For a comprehensive study of the amendments to the Income Tax Act
relating to Canadian Exploration Expenses, see Watkins, Recent Developments
in Petroleum Taxation, in 1981 PRAiRI TAX CONFERENCE 74-79 (1981) (Canadian Tax Foundation); Watkins & McKee, Recent Developments in Petroleum
Taxation and the Canadian Ownership Rules under the National Energy Program, 20 ALTA. L. REv. 46 (1982).
48. See An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, sec. 34(9).
49. Id. sec. 35(5).
50. See Income Tax Act § 66.2(5)(a)(i)(B).
51. See An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, sec. 35(11).
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tives with direct incentive payments. 2 For individuals, the depletion allowance is eliminated completely as of January 1, 1981.
The thirty-three and one-third percent depletion allowances for
qualifying exploration expenses incurred in 1981 and 1982, net of
any incentive payments, is maintained for corporations. Development expenses no longer will be eligible for the depletion allowance. After 1982, the thirty-three and one-third percent depletion
allowance on the Canada lands remains for corporations only. For
other taxpayers, the rate will drop to twenty percent in 1983 and
to ten percent in 1984; it will be phased out completely by 1985.2
A problem arises, not because the earned depletion is being
phased out, but because the depletion is phased out for all entities and replaced by direct incentive payments available only to
those qualifying under the Canadian ownership rate (COR)
rules.54 Although this clearly is a discriminatory measure, it re-

mains to be seen whether this discrimination is legal under Canada's international obligation.
3. New Federal Taxes and Charges
a. Royalties from Canada lands
The new Canada Oil and Gas Act,55 enacted as part of the
NEP, assesses a ten percent royalty on all production from the
Yukon and Northwest Territories, the Arctic Ocean (including
the Beaufort Sea), and the federal offshore areas. 5 e An additional
progressive incremental royalty equal to forty percent of the net
profits of an oil and gas field must be paid by producers whose
52. NEP, supranote 1, at 38-39. Amendments to §§ 1205-1206 of the Income
Tax Regulations, ch. 945, Consol. Regs. Can. (1978) (as amended), implement
this aspect of the NEP. See 1981 P.C. 3329 (Nov. 26, 1981), reprinted in Can.
Gaz., pt. II, at 3739 (Dec. 9, 1981).
53.

See Watkins, supra note 47, at 86-91. Originally, the depletion allowance

on conventional lands was to be phased out in 1984. See NEP, supra note 1, at
39, and amendments to the Income Tax Regulations, ch. 945 Consol. Regs. Can.
(1978). The Canada-Alberta Agreement of September 1, 1981, however, extends
the phasing out process by one year, thus requiring further amendments to the
Income Tax Regulations. At the time of this Article's completion, those amendments had not been passed.
54. See infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
55. Ch. 81, 1980-1982, Can. Stat., reprintedin I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 12, at
2655 (1981).
56. Id. § 40(1).
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rate of return is over twenty-five percent.57 Net profits will be
computed after deducting investment and capital allowances."

These royalties are justified because they represent the price paid
to the owner of the resource for the privilege or right to explore

and extract it. Their equivalent may be found in provincial legislation59 and in contracts involving freehold land.
b. The Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax
As originally proposed in the NEP, a new Petroleum and Gas
Revenue Tax (PGRT) of eight percent of Canadian oil and gas
production revenue was to be levied beginning January 1, 1981.
The tax also applied to royalty payments based on oil and gas
production. The purpose of the tax was to increase the federal
government's share of the revenue from Canadian oil and gas pro-

duction.60 Industry strongly opposed this new tax for two reasons.6 1 First, industry felt that the tax was structured to resemble
a royalty payable to the owner of the resource because it was not

deductible as an expense for income tax purposes. Second, industry argued that the PGRT was equivalent to a tax of approxi-

mately twelve percent.6 2 Nonetheless, the PGRT proposal was
confirmed and expanded by the Canada-Alberta Agreement of
September 1, 1981,8 that provided for a sixteen percent PGRT

with a possible twenty-five percent resource allowance deduction." This tax can be criticized on the grounds that it disregards

57. Id. § 41(1).
58. Id. § 41(5). For a comprehensive study, see Wickerson, Canada Oil and
Gas Act, in TAx TREATMENT OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENERGY PROGRAM-A TECHNIcAL ANALYSIS 129 (1982) (Canadian Tax

Foundation).
59. See, e.g., Mines and Minerals Act, ALTA. REV. STAT., ch. M-15 §§ 13(3),
28, 113 (1980); Alta. Reg. 23/74, Alta. Gaz. pt. II, at 223 (Apr. 15, 1974),
amended by Alta. Begs. 251/74, 243/76, 9/77, 249/79, 268/79, & 162/80.
60. See NEP, supra note 1, at 37-38. For details on the PGRT, see PRICE,
WATERHOUSE & Co., supra note 45, at 14-15; Watkins, supra note 47, at 112-17.
61. See, e.g., McCallum, Mobil Canada cites NEP as it cuts spending plans,
The Globe & Mail (Toronto), Jan. 22, 1981, at B2; see also McCallum, Independent Oilmen's President calls NEP a Nationaldisaster,The Globe & Mail (Toronto), Mar. 11, 1981, at B7; Transcript of direct evidence by witness of Amoco
Canada Petroleum Co. before the National Energy Board at 4 (Jan. 1981).
62.

For effects on profits, see W. DOBSON, CANADA'S ENERGY POLICY DEBATE

24 n.32 (C.D. Howe Institute 1981).
63. See Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, at 10.
64. Id. As far as the resource allowance is concerned, amendments to the
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the company's ability to pay and that only infinitesimal deductions are allowed in computing the production revenue.
The Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act 5 enacted the PGRT.
Amendments were needed, however, because the Agreement of
September 1, 1981, between the federal government and the Government of Alberta on energy pricing and taxation imposed a new
rate. 6 Also, the NEP Update of 1982 announced a reduction of
the PGRT rate from sixteen percent to fourteen and two-thirds
percent for a one year period beginning June 1, 1982,67 along with
a small producer's PGRT exemption of $250,000.8
c.

The Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax

As originally planned under the NEP, all natural gas sales
would have been subjected to a new Natural Gas and Gas Liquids
Tax (NGGLT)6 9 As often happens in Canada, this unilateral tax
measure, which was imposed by one level of government for its
own benefit, was partially rescinded after much legal and political
debate.7 0 The NEP had proposed that all domestic and export
natural gas sales be subject to a levy under a new Natural Gas
and Gas Liquids Tax that was later enacted by amending the Excise Tax Act.71 The rate was set initially at $0.30 per million cubic
feet and was to increase gradually to $0.75 per million cubic feet
by 1983.72 Provincial reaction was swift and immediate. Saskatchewan and British Columbia witheld payment of the tax.7 3 Alberta
Income Tax Regulations, CONSOL. REGS. CAN., ch. 945, § 1210(1) (1978), must be
passed.

65. An Act to amend the Excise Tax Act and the Excise Act and to provide
for a revenue tax in respect of petroleum and gas, ch. 68, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,
secs. 78-117, reprinted in HI Can. Gaz. vol. 6, no. 10, at 2457 (1981).

66. See An Act to amend the statute law relating to certain taxes, ch. 104,
1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 20, reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3087
(1982) (amending the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax Act § 84).

67. NEP UPDATE, supranote 2, at 73. At the time of completion of this Article, September 1982, no implementing legislation had been tabled.
68. Id. at 74. Again, implementing legislation is not yet tabled.
69. NEP, supra note 1, at 35-36.
70. Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, at 9.
71. Ch. 68, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 43, reprinted in I Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no.
10, at 2457 (1981).
72. Id. (adding to the Excise Tax Act § 25.13).

73. These provinces finally came to terms with the federal government in
agreements similar to the Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11. The Canada-British Columbia Agreement, reprintedin 1982 CAN. ENERGY PROGRAM REP.
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challenged the constitutional validity of the new tax in court and
won, although the victory 7 was
limited in scope because the fact
4
situation was very narrow.

In the Canada-Alberta Agreement on Energy Pricing and Taxation of September 1, 1981, the federal government agreed "to reduce the NGGLT to a zero rate on exports of natural gas
originating in an agreeing province. 'T7' The Agreement adds, how-

ever, that "[t]his decision is without prejudice to the Government
of Canada's position that it has the right to levy such a tax. 76
The zero rate will remain in effect until December 31, 1986. The
levy will remain for domestic gas sales.
d. Other changes
(i) Petroleum Compensation Charge.-The NEP proposes a
new Petroleum Compensation Charge, to be borne by the consumer, that will compensate for the difference between the cost of
domestic and federally-subsidized imported oil.7 This charge was
implemented by amendments to the Petroleum Administration
Act."8

(ii) FederalExport Tax.-The NEP, as originally proposed in
1980, recites that "an export tax is levied on oil equal to the difference between the domestic price and the export price. ' 9 The
tax, levied under the Petroleum Administration Act,80 will remain, but the revenues are to be shared with the producing provinces, on a fifty percent basis.
(iii) Canadian Ownership Tax.-As mentioned above,
Canadianization is the object of the NEP. To help finance this
goal, the NEP proposed a levy on Canadian oil and gas consump(CCH) 75,501, was signed on September 24, 1981, and the Canada-Saskatchewan

Agreement, reprinted in id. at 76,101, was signed on October 26, 1981.
74. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
75. See Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, at 9.
76. Id.
77. NEP, supra note 1, at 30.
78. See Petroleum Administration Act, ch. 47, 1974-1976 Can. Stat.,
amended by ch. 28, 1976-1977 Can. Stat.; ch. 24, 1977-1978 Can. Stat.; ch. 114,
1980-1982 Can. Stat., secs. 29-38 (new pt. m.1 entitled Petroleum Compensation

Charge).
79. NEP, supra note 1, at 36.
80. Ch. 47, 1974-1976 Can. Stat. § 7, amended by ch. 114, 1980-1982 Can.
Stat., sec. 4.
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tion.8s The rate of the levy, to be determined by regulations
promulgated under the Petroleum Administration Act,8 2 is

lun-

specified because it depends upon the progress toward Canadianization made through state acquisitions. For instance, after the
Petrofina acquisition of 1981, a Canadian Ownership Tax of $1.15
per barrel of oil and $0.15 per million cubic feet of natural gas
was levied. 83 The cost of this tax, also called the Canadianization
Tax, is to be borne by the consumer. Future acquisitions obviously will increase this tax.
(iv) Incremental Oil Revenue Tax.-The Canada-Alberta
Agreement of September 1, 1981, had the effect of imposing yet
another levy, the Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (IORT) that was
introduced in the federal budget of November 12, 1981, and became effective January 1, 1982.2 The tax "will be 50 percent of
the additional revenues the industry receives as a result of prices
on old oil being higher than prices set out in the 1980 National
Energy Program." 5 On the other hand, this incremental old oil
revenue will not be subject to income taxation.86 The NEP Update of May 31, 1982, announced that the tax would be suspended from June 1, 1982 to May 31, 1983,7 in order to alleviate
present cash flow problems in the oil industry.

81. NEP, supra note 1, at 51.
82. An Act to amend the Petroleum Administration Act and to enact provisions related thereto, ch. 114, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., sec. 39 (adding pt. I.2 entitled Canadian Ownership Provisions).

supra note 45, at 20.
84. See Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, at 10. The IORT has
been implemented in An Act to amend the statute law relating to certain taxes,
seces. 19-20 (adding § 83.1 and amending § 84 of the Petroleum and Gas Revenue
Tax Act).
83.

See PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co.,

85. THE BUDGET IN MORE DETAm, Nov. 12, 1981, at 57.
86. See PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co., supra note 45, at 17; see also CanadaAlberta Agreement, supra note 11, at S17 ("incremental revenue will be excluded from income for the purposes of income taxation"). This has been enacted by An Act to Amend the statute law relating to certain taxes, sec. 31(l)

(amending the Income Tax Act § 81(1)).
87. See NEP UPDATE, supra note 2, at 74 (the one year elimination is to be
implemented through the regulatory process).

CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM

1983]
III.

SPECIFIC CANADIANIZATION PROVISIONS OF THE CANADIAN
ENERGY PROGRAM

A. Canadian Ownership and Control and the Petroleum
Incentives Program
Bill C-104, assented to in June 1982,8 includes a Canadian
Ownership and Control Determination Act along with a Petroleum Incentives Program Act whereby incentives available under
the latter are based upon eligibility criteria provided by the
former.
1.

The Canadian Ownership and Control DeterminationAct

This Act established a legislative framework for the administrative certification of the Canadian ownership rate (COR) and status of Canadian control of persons, including corporations. These
criteria will be used to implement some of the Canadianization
objectives of the NEP such as Petroleum Incentives Program
Payment applications, or production license applications in the
Canada lands.
This type of legally enacted economic nationalism is not new to
Canada. The Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 (FIRA) s9
serves both as a background to the NEP and as a model for the
COR concept. The main purpose of FIRA was to ensure that new
direct foreign investment would be authorized only if it was beneficial to Canada. Section 2 of the FIRA contains a lengthy
description of this aim.90 The Act provides five criteria for use in
88. An Act Respecting Petroleum Incentives and Canadian Ownership and

Control Determination and to amend the Foreign Investment Review Act, ch.
107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., reprinted in MI Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no. 16, at 3131
(1982).
89. Ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat.
90. Id. § 2(1). Section 2(1) provides:
This Act is enacted by the Parliament of Canada in recognition by Parliament that the extent to which control of Canadian industry, trade and
commerce has become acquired by persons other than Canadians and the
effect thereof on the ability of Canadians to maintain effective control over
their economic environment is a matter of national concern, and that it is
therefore expedient to establish a means by which measures may be taken
under the authority of Parliament to ensure that, in so far as is practicable
after the enactment of this Act, control of Canada business enterprises
may be acquired by persons other than Canadians, and new businesses
may be established in Canada by persons, other than Canadians, who are
not already carrying on business in Canada or whose new businesses in
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determining whether a proposed investment is beneficial to Canada.0 1 The FIRA applies to two types of foreign investments:
first, the acquisition of control of a Canadian business enterprise
by foreign individuals, corporations, governments, or groups containing foreign members through the acquisition of assets or
shares; and second, the establishment of a new business in Canada by foreign persons who do not already have an existing business in Canada, or by foreign persons who have an existing business in Canada if the new business is unrelated to the existing
business.92 There are, of course, thresholds to the review
procedure.93
Canada would be unrelated to the businesses already being carried on by
them in Canada, only if it has been assessed that the acquisition of control
of those enterprises or the establishment of those new businesses, as the
case may be, by those persons is or is likely to be of significant benefit to
Canada, having regard to all of the factors to be taken into account under
this act for that purpose.
91. Id. § 2(2)(a)-(e). That section provides:
(a) [T]he effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature
of economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the
utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on
exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise or new business forms or would form
a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within
any industry or industries in Canada; and
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of
any province likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or
establishment.
92. Id. § 3(1).
93. See id. § 5(1)(c), which provides that the Act does not apply to the acquisition of a business enterprise whose gross assets do not exceed $250,000 and
whose annual gross revenue does not exceed $3 million. See also Foreign Investment Review Regulations, § 6(1), which provide an abbreviated form of notice
for small business investment proposals involving the establishnient or acquisition of a business with gross assets of less than $2 million and fewer than 100
employees. The last federal budget proposed to raise this threshold to $5 million
and 200 employees. 124 H.C. DEBATES, no. 370, at 18,880-81 (June 28, 1982).

1983]

CANADIAN NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM

Bill C-104 requires individuals, corporations, partnerships, and
trusts to have a certificate showing their Canadian ownership rate
(COR) and their control status. The bill provides that the following persons are qualified to apply for a certificate:
(a) an individual other than a non-eligible person;
(b) a corporation incorporated in Canada;
(c) a partnership... governed by the laws of a province;
(d) a trustee in respect of a trust, if the trustee and beneficiaries
are, with respect to their status as such, governed by the laws of a
province;
(e) an insurance company incorporated in Canada in respect of any
of its segregated funds within the meaning of the regulations; and
(f) any person prescribed as being qualified to apply for a certificate or who falls into a class 94of persons prescribed as being qualified to apply for a certificate.
The term "non-eligible person" as used by subsection (a) is defined in the FIRA 5 Persons qualified to apply under subsection

(f) are listed in section 6 of the Canadian Ownership and Control
Determination (Draft) Regulations which provides that "[a] corporation incorporated outside Canada is qualified to apply for a
certificate if (a) it is wholly owned by a corporation incorporated
in Canada, (b) it was incorporated prior to October 29, 1980, and
(c) its activities have been conducted primarily in Canada at all
times after October 28, 1980."96
The application must be filed in the form and manner prescribed by the regulations. Similarly, the COR and control status
94. Ch.107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 37, reprintedin III Can. Gaz., vol. 6, no.
16, at 3131 (1982).

95. Id. § 35(2). Section 35(2) provides: "For the purposes of this Part, the
expression 'non-eligible person' has the same meaning as it has under section 3
of the Foreign Investment Review Act. . . ." Section 3 of the Foreign Investment Review Act defines a "non-eligible person" as including "an individual
who is neither a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident or a corporation incorporated in Canada or elsewhere that is controlled directly or indirectly by
such an individual or group of individuals." Foreign Investment Review Act, ch.
46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. § 3.
96.

CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, CANADIAN
DETERMINATION DRAFT REGULATIONS (1982) [hereinaf-

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

ter cited as DRArr REGULATIONS]. At the time of completion of this writing the
final regulations had not yet been passed; however, the Petroleum Incentives
Act, supra note 3, ch. 107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 62(1), gives temporary status
to the draft regulations for a first application made within six months after part
II comes into force. Id.
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are determined in accordance with Part II of the Act and the regulationsY7 Certain persons are presumed to have a 100 percent
COR.9 s These persons still must establish the facts that give rise
to that presumption in order to obtain their COR certificate.9" An
applicant who asks for a control status certificate also must show
that he is under Canadian control because the COR designation
does not create control status.100
For most applicants, the COR is determined on the basis of formal equity. 101 In the case of corporate applicants, this is done by
measuring the percentage of shares held by Canadians. 10 2 When
partnerships or trusts are involved, the relationship between the
Canadian participation and the capital or income must be deterPetroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, § 38; see also DRAFT REGULAsupra note 96, at pt. II, §§ 12-25.
98. See DRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 96, §§ 7-10.
99. Section 7 of the DRAFT REGULATIONS, supranote 96, provides: "[t]he...
persons... are deemed to have a COR of 100% if they are qualified to apply
for a certificate." Id. § 7.
100. Indeed, Canadian control is determined under §§ 35(2) and 38(2) of the
Petroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, which refers, with certain exceptions, to
the concept of the "non-eligible person" of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. The control status is, therefore, determined under
the latter.
101. See DRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 96, § 12.
102. The COR of a person, which has one class of formal equity (as defined
hereinafter), shall be the beneficial ownership of that class of formal equity determined in accordance with part two of the DRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 93,
and the COR rate of a person which has more than one class of formal equity
shall be: "(a) [T]he weighted average of the beneficial ownership of those classes
of formal equity which in the opinion of the Minister may be weighted, or (b)
the lowest of the beneficial Canadian Ownership of each class of formal equity
97.

TIONS,

determined in accordance with this part." See

DRAFT REGULATIONS,

supra note

96, §§ 6, 12-13. Formal equity means:
(a) with respect to a corporation, any share of the corporation, other than
a share excluded by the regulations, that is, or is deemed under the regulations to be, issued and outstanding,
(b) with respect to a partnership, any interest or right in the capital or
income, or both, of the partnership,
(c) with respect to a trust, any beneficial interest in the property of the
trust and
(d) with respect to any other person, such interest or right in respect of
that person as is prescribed ....
Petroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, ch. 107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 35. For
the rules determining the beneficial Canadian ownership of a class of formal
equity, see id. §§ 19-20.
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mined.1 03 This Article will not examine at length the detailed
COR calculation rules because they have been covered elsewhere. 1°4 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that these

rules, which are contained in the regulations, provide that, when
the applicant is a corporation, partnership, or trust, the COR
level of each class of ownership must be measured. 10 5 A class of
ownership may comprise shares in a corporation, debts that are
equity investments, or interests in a partnership.108 To determine
the COR of an applicant, the COR of each class of formal equity
must be determined in order to calculate a weighted average. If
this is not practicable, the
COR of the applicant will be the low107
est COR of the classes.

An examination of the list of a corporation's shareholders is not
sufficient to determine the COR of a class if the list includes corporate shareholders. 08 In such a case, the citizenship and residence of the investors in the shareholding corporations are examined to the extent of the third link of arms-length
ownership. 09
The FIRA and its regulations provide the method used to determine Canadian control. 110 This method is designed to identify
the person or group of persons who are in effective control, as
opposed to legal control, of the applicant.
COR and control status certificates are to be issued by the
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.' Generally, a certificate becomes effective as of the acknowledged date of receipt of
the application and, subject to material variations, it continues to
be effective for one year or for such longer period-not to exceed
two years-as may be prescribed by regulation. 112 The holder of a
certificate must file a new application or amend his original appli103.

See supra note 102.

104. See, e.g., PETROLEUM

MONITORING AGENCY, METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT

OF CANADIAN OWNERSHIP AND DETERMINATION OF CONTROL UNDER THE NATIONAL

ENERGY
McKee,
105.
106.
107.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

PROGRAM, (Rep. No. M27-24/1981 E) (1981). See generally Watkins &
supra note 47.
See supra note 102.
Id.
See Watkins & McKee, supra note 47, at 65-66.

Id. at 67-70.
Id. at 71.
Ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat.
Ch. 107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 39(3).
Id. § 42(1).
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cation when any one of the following occurs:
(a) the certificate shows the holder to be Canadian controlled and
he has ceased to be Canadian controlled;
(b) the Canadian ownership rate of the holder has decreased in the
circumstances prescribed by more than the prescribed number of
percentage points;
(c) the holder knows or ought to know that the certificate was issued on the basis of an erroneous determination or false or misleading information;
(d) the holder knows or ought to know that any provision of an
agreement, arrangement or undertaking that was submitted with
the application for the certificate was breached or was not fully
observed; or
(e) the Minister requires the application or amendment to be made
113

An applicant may file in the same way if its Canadian ownership
114
rate has increased or if it has become Canadian controlled.
2.

The Petroleum Incentives Program

The Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP) was also enacted by
Bill C-104. 1 5 As stated in the NEP, the program has the following two objectives:
[E]stablish the basis for Canadians to seize control of their own
energy future through Security of supply and ultimate independence from the world oil market; [and] Offer to Canadians, all
Canadians, the real opportunity to participate in.the energy industry in general and the petroleum industry in particular, and to
share in the benefits of industry expansion.116
The primary aim of PIP is to meet these objectives of energy security while encouraging increased Canadian ownership and control of the industry. In fact, however, this program mainly replaces existing earned depletion allowance tax incentives. A 1981
departmental paper noted:
113. Id. § 43(1).
114. Id. § 43(3).
115. Petroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, ch. 107, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.,

pt. I. As a result of the Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, the government of Alberta administers and finances its own PIP program. The two programs are similar.
116. See NEP, supra note 1, at 2.
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To date, the major federal incentives for oil and gas exploration
and development have been provided through the income tax system. The PIP represents an attempt to move away from this taxbased incentives system, which was only of benefit to firms in a
taxable position, to one which delivers grants to firms directly. It is
expected that the program will help maintain and, indeed, acceler117
ate the pace of exploration and development activity in Canada.

As mentioned earlier, the NEP also stated that the federal government was committed to achieving at least fifty percent Canadian ownership of the industry by 1990.118 The federal government apparently believes that the industry also will meet these
objectives through PIP while maintaining an attractive investment environment for foreign-owned firms. 11 9
The PIP concept is simple; it calls for cash incentive payments,
in addition to the general Crown share incentive of twenty-five
percent of exploration expenses in the Canada lands, to applicants that are Canadian-controlled and have a COR of fifty per-

cent or more with respect to certain exploration, development,
and asset costs.12 0 The incentives increase as the COR increases
and represent a determined percentage of the expenditures incurred. The incentives also depend on the type of expenditures,
the area involved, and the year in which these expenses were incurred. 121 The extent of PIP grants available is indicated by'the

117.

CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINEs AND RESOURCEs, THE PETRO-

LEUM INCENTIVES PROGRAM at vii (1981).

118. See NEP, supra note 1, at 102-03.
119. In the Canada lands, a Crown share incentive of 25% is available to all
companies which are incurring eligible exploration expenditures as defined. Petroleum Incentive Act, supra note 3, § 3. This Crown share incentive is supposed
to promote exploration while providing a share of such expenditures commensurate with the Government's retained interest in the Canada lands.
120. These terms are defined in the Petroleum Incentives Programs Regulations, 116 Can. Gaz. §§ 9-11, at 2439 (1982). Hence, the eligible exploration and
development expenses are "Canadian exploration expense" and "Canadian development expense," subject to prescribed modifications, under the Income Tax
Act §§ 66.1(6)(a), 66.2(5)(a), and the eligible asset costs are prescribed by the
regulations to be the capital cost of new tertiary recovery equipment and the

cost of converting previously used equipment into tertiary recovery equipment.
Id.
121.

The ranges of COR are described at § 10 of the Petroleum Incentives

Act, supra note 3, and the levels of incentives are described in §§ 7-9 of the
same Act.
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following table: 12 2
PIP PAYMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURES
COR level of
applicant*

Provincial Lands
Exploration
Development
expenses
expenses &
asset costs

Level 1 (1981-1986)
Level 2 (1981)
(1982-1983)
(1984-1986)
Level 3 (1981-1986)
Level 4 (1981-1986)

-

Canada Lands
Exploration
Development
expenses**
expenses &
asset costs
25

-

-

35

-

10
15
25
35

10
10
15
20

45
50
65
80

10
10
15
20

*Canadian individuals are deemed to have a COR level of 4. Corporation COR levels are as
follows:
Level 1: less than 50% COR.
Level 2: 50% COR plus.
Level 3: 60% COR in 1981, increasing 1% per year to 65% by 1986.
Level 4: 65% COR in 1981, increasing 2% per year to 75% by 1986.
**Percentages include the 25% Crown Share Incentive (section 3 of Petroleum Incentives
Program Act).

Note that PIP grants are available only to participants who
own a working interest in property or who are acquiring a working interest as a result of those expenditures for which they are
seeking PIP grants. 123 There are also "anti-leakage" rules that
prevent PIP payments to entities with insufficient COR levels.12 4
The rules provide for lowering eligible expenses; this usually will
occur when entities with different COR levels have an interest in
the same oil or gas play.
B. Canadianization Measures Under the Canada Oil and Gas
Act
As previously mentioned, the NEP includes a Canada Oil and
Gas Act 25 that makes considerable changes in the regulation of
122. See

PETROLEUM INCoNTvzS ADMINSTRATON, APPLICANT'S

GUIDE app. 3,

at 58 (1982) (Minister of Supply and Services).
123. Petroleum Incentives Act, supra note 3, pt. I, § 4(b); Petroleum Incentives Program Regulations, 116 Can. Gaz. § 8, at 2439 (1982).
124. See Petroleum Incentives Program Regulations, 116 Can. Gaz., pt. H, at
2439 (1982).
125. Ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. Actually, the title is deceiving. A Federal
Lands Oil and Gas Act would not have been such a misnomer. Indeed, most of
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oil and gas in the Canada lands.126 The new act will govern exploration, development, and production activities on these lands because the previously existing system of licenses and permits
under the old Canada Oil and Gas Lands Regulations 127 is now
being phased out. The former system will be replaced by detailed
exploration agreements during a corresponding phase-in period.12 8
Canadian oil and gas legislation applies to lands under Provincial jurisdiction.
The title must thus be understood in the political context of Canadian
Federalism.
126. Id. § 2(1). "Canada Lands" refers to those areas of Canada not within
Provincial boundaries. It has the meaning of:
...lands that belong to Her Majesty in right of Canada, or in respect of
which Her Majesty in right of Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit
the natural resources and that are situated in
(a) the Yukon Territory or the Northwest Territories, or Sable Island, or
(b) those submarine areas, not within a province, adjacent to the coast of
Canada and extending throughout the natural prolongation of the land
territory of Canada to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a
distance of two hundred miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea of Canada is measured, whichever is the greater.
Id.
As far as the application of the Act to Canada's East Coast is concerned, an
agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Nova
Scotia was reached on March 2, 1982, reprintedin 1982 CAN. ENERGY PROGRAM
REP. (CCH) 76,501, relating to oil and gas resource management and revenue
sharing in Nova Scotia's offshore area without prejudice to their respective legal
positions. The agreement provides for a joint Board of five members, three of
which represent the Canadian Government and two of which represent the Nova
Scotian Government, chaired by the Administrator of the Canada Oil and Gas
Lands Administration. An agency, which reports to the Board, administers oil
and gas activities under the Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can.
Stat. The agreement also provides for mechanisms regarding respective participation to the Crown share and the sharing of revenues such as royalties under
the Canada Oil and Gas Act or the petroleum and gas revenue tax. No agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland had been reached at the time of completion of this writing. For a discussion

regarding the jurisdictional question, see R.

HARRISON,

supra note 20.

127. The former regulations, Canada Oil and Gas Regulation, CONSOL. REGS.
CAN., ch. 1518 (1978), remain in force to the extent that they are consistent with
the new Act until they are revoked or replaced by new regulations. All interests
provided by the former regulations that were in force when the new Act was
enacted continue in force subject to §§ 63-73 of the new Act. The interests provided for under the Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat., replace all oil or gas rights or prospects acquired or vested in relation to Canada
lands prior to the enactment of the new Act. Id. §§ 61(1), 62(1)-(2).
128. Id.
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An exploration agreement for Canada lands confers "the right to
explore for and the exclusive right to drill for oil or gas, the exclusive right to develop those Canada lands in order to produce oil
or gas and the exclusive right, subject to compliance with the
other provisions of this Act, to obtain a production licence. ' '129
The provisions of the exploration agreements are quite comprehensive,1' 30 and some specifics with transnational implications will

be dealt with below. First, an exploration agreement requires that
participants submit a plan to the Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources for approval prior to the commencement of any work
program. The plan must contain provisions for the employment
of Canadians and for providing Canadian manufacturers, consultants, contractor and service companies with a full and fair opportunity to participate on a competitive basis in the supply of
goods and services.13 1 Second, the exploration agreement may require equity participation by the Government of Canada and
Canadians, including any aboriginal peoples of Canada-that may
be affected by the exploration agreement.132
A point of contention is the Crown share mentioned in section
27 of the Act. Section 27 reads as follows:
(1) "Crown share" means the share reserved to Her Majesty in
right of Canada under subsections (2) and (3).
(2) Subject to subsection 62(5), there is hereby reserved to Her
Majesty in right of Canada, and the Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources on Her behalf shall hold, a twenty-five percent share
(a) in an interest provided under this Act in respect of Canada lands that were Crown reserve lands immediately prior to
the interest; and
(b) in the first interest provided in respect of the relevant
Canada lands under any of sections 63, 64 and 66.
(3) Subject to being disposed of pursuant to section 32, the share
of Her Majesty in right of Canada under subsection (2) is reserved
out of any interest that succeeds the interest, out of which it was
133

previously reserved.

An exception alleviates the effect of this drastic provision. The
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. § 9.
Id. §§ 9-16.
Id. § 10(2)-(3).
Id. § 10(2)(d).
Id. § 27. Paragraph 27(2)(b) refers to transitional provisions. Id.
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twenty-five percent interest is exacted whether or not the lands
already are subject to a supposedly exclusive license or permit
unless production commenced before 1981.134
Section 61(2) of the Canada Oil and Gas Act also relates to the
Crown share and reads as follows:
No party shall have any right to claim or receive any compensation, damages, indemnity or other form of relief from Her Majesty
in right of Canada or from any servant or agent thereof for any
acquired, vested or future right or entitlement or any prospect
or for any
thereof that is replaced or otherwise affected by this Act,
3
duty of liability imposed on that party by this Act.

Moreover, after December 31, 1982, an exploration agreement
must provide that, as periodically required by the Minister, each
interest holder shall obtain and provide the Minister with evidence that the interest holder's COR is in a form satisfactory to
the Minister.3 6
Once the exploration phase has ended, the production stage begins. A production license is required to confer the exclusive right
87
to produce oil and gas and pass title to the oil or gas produced,
subject to the payment to the Crown of any applicable royalty.""
The Minister will not grant or renew a production license unless
satisfied that the beneficial owner of the license has a COR of at
least fifty percent. The Act thus provides that the licensee:
(a) if an individual, would be a Canadian citizen ordinarily resident
in Canada or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration Act, 1976, other than one who has been ordinarily resident in Canada for more than one year after the time at which he
first became eligible to apply for Canadian citizenship;
(b) if a corporation, would be incorporated in Canada and have a
Canadian ownership rate of not less than fifty percent; or
(c) if two or more individuals or corporations or individuals and
corporations would be comprised of individuals referred to in paragraph (a) or corporations incorporated in Canada or both and
would have a Canadian ownership rate of not less than fifty
134. Id. § 28.

135. Id. § 61(2). Limited cases exist where compensation is paid for expenses
incurred before 1981, but this compensation only will be payable out of future
profits. See id. § 29.
136. Id. § 10(5).
137. Id. § 17.
138. Id. §§ 40-41.
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percent. 89

The Act also covers applicants whose COR is below fifty per140
cent or falls below fifty percent during the term of the license.
In such cases, the Crown will own a share in the production license equal to the difference between fifty percent and the actual
COR of the interest owner, as determined by the Minister. This
Crown share will be disposed of at the earliest opportunity by a
public tender open only to those parties with a seventy-five percent COR, and to individuals as previously defined. 141
It readily can be seen that this Act changes the law considerably. Although somewhat outside the scope of this Article, it
should be mentioned that some criticism has been aimed at other
provisions of the Act, such as those involving transfer and assignment, cancellation of rights and production orders,
the new roy14
alty regime, and the broad discretionary powers.

C. The Act to Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act
To properly implement the NEP's Canadian ownership and
control provisions, corporations had to be given adequate legal
means to operate under the new rules. Because federal company
law was ill-equipped for this purpose, the Canada Business Corporations Act had to be amended. 143 The Act made the following
two changes: (1) a corporation henceforth will have the power to
hold shares in itself to assist it or any of its affiliates or associates
to qualify for licenses, permits, grants, payments, or other benefits;44 and (2) a corporation henceforth will have the power to

restrict the issue and ownership of new classes of shares."45 These
139. Id. § 19(1).
140. Id. § 23(1)-(2).
141. Id. §§ 19(1), 23(6).
142. See, e.g., Submission to the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works on Bill C-48 (statement by the Canadian Bar Association), reprintedin House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of
the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, Issue No.
421, app. "RESS-35," at 42A:132 (1981); see also Brief (submitted by Dome Petroleum Limited), reprinted in id., Issue No. 43, app. "RESS-36," at 43A:1
(1981).
143. Canada Business Corporations Act, ch. 33, 1974-1976 Can. Stat. (as

amended).
144. An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, ch. 115, 19801982 Can. Stat. cl. 2 (enacting § 31.1).
145. Id. cls. 1, 8 (enacting §§ 6(1)(d), 168).
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amendments will enable a corporation to attain or maintain a
specified level of Canadian ownership or control. The Act also
1 46
provides for coercive machinery to enforce these provisions.
Thus, a corporation will be able to sell constrained shares held by
a shareholder in violation of these provisions. Such constraints
must be noted conspicuously on the share certificates; moreover,
the corporation will not have the power to sell the shares unless it
has given notice and has followed the conditions prescribed by
federal regulations. 147 The proceeds of 48the sale form a trust fund
for the benefit of the divested owner.

These amendments, though technical in nature, constitute a departure from the usual standard of free ownership and transfer of
shares of public corporations because foreign investors are precluded from acquiring them.149 Within the context of the general
design of Canadianization, however, these changes are logical.
D. Other Canadianization Provisions
The NEP originally announced the establishment of a new
Crown corporation that would have operated as a "national gas
bank" to purchase gas that could not be sold to Canadian-controlled firms. 150 No legislation to implement this provision was introduced and, in National Energy Program Update of May 31,
1982,151 the federal government announced that it had "decided
not to proceed with the Gas Bank.' 1

52

The NEP also mentioned

that the National Energy Board would be asked to give preference to Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled firms when
considering export applications.5 8 No implementing legislation
has been introduced.
The Canadian ownership tax'" is another major component of
146. Id. cl. 4 (adding pt. V.1 entitled Sale of constrained shares to the CBCA
§§ 43.1-.2).

147. Id. cl. 5 (enacting § 45(8.2)); cl. 4 (enacting § 43.1).
148.

Id. § 43.2.

149. The United States administration has expressed its concern over the
measures stating that they "could depress prices of stock in foreign hands since

non-Canadians could be excluded as potential shareholders." See Hormats,
supra note 14, at 54.

150. See NEP, supra note 1, at 42.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See NEP UPDATE, supra note 2.
Id. at 63.
See NEP, supra note 1, at 50.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.

332

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16.301

Canadianization because it provides for a fund enabling the federal government to acquire the Canadian assets of multinational
oil companies. 155 Finally, it must be mentioned that the NEP
seems to instruct the Foreign Investment Review Agency to review carefully transactions by foreigners that involve a change of
control or the establishment of a new business in the Canadian oil
and gas industry. 156 Mounting criticism of this approach in the
United States and in Canada,1 57 however, eventually could elicit a
less demanding attitude from the Agency.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE CANADIAN
ENERGY PROGRAM

A.

Discrimination and the NEP: An Overview

The NEP clearly discriminates against foreign-owned or controlled interests. Whether this discrimination is legal remains an
open question. It is appropriate at this juncture to present facts,
reactions, statements of the law, and opinions that may be useful
if a party such as the United States seeks legal recourse.
1. DiscriminatoryMeasures in the NEP
The National Energy Program is discriminatory in the sense
that foreign-owned firms are treated less favorably than Canadian-owned firms when applying for production licenses, exploration incentive grants, and national treatment generally. The main
discriminatory element of the NEP is the replacement of the depletion allowance, which was available to all entities, with PIP
grants, which are available only to firms that have a high level of
Canadian ownership. The procurement provisions are just as discriminatory and may hurt foreign-owned original licensees even
more if economic factors are taken into account. Furthermore,
over and above the twenty-five percent "back-in," an oil or gas
play needs another twenty-five percent Canadian interest to be
eligible for a production license under the new Canada Oil and
155. As a result, Petro-Canada, a Federal Government Corporation, was able

to bring about the takeover of Petrofina Canada in February 1981. See NEP
supra note 2, at 47.
156. See NEP, supra note 1, at 50.
157. See, e.g., CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

UPDATE,

BRIEF TO THE HON. HERB GRAY,
MINISTER OF INDusTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT, (Sept. 24, 1981); see also Hormats, supra note 14, at 52.
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Gas Act. 158

The phasing-out of depletion allowances is no small matter.
The federal government's intentions are clear; in its supplementary information on the budget of October 28, 1980, the Department of Finance stated that "[d]epletion and other incentive deductions have reduced the effective federal tax rate in the oil and
gas sector .... These incentives have primarily benefited large
established corporations which are generally foreign-owned or
controlled."15 The Department added that these tax incentives
were of little use to the smaller Canadian-owned corporations
that did not have sufficient income to benefit from them.6L Thus,
the NEP provides for "a new incentive in the form of direct incentive payments for exploration and development [under which]
[t]he rate of incentive payment will be higher for Canadianowned firms."' 6' As a result, the need for the tax-based incentives
is reduced and depletion allowances, which were available to all,
are to be phased out. The maximum benefits derived from the
PIP grants that replace them
are available only to Canadian62
owned and controlled firms.

The procurement provisions of the NEP originally were heavyhanded. The NEP announced new legislation restructuring the legal framework governing oil and gas activity on the Canada lands.
One of the objectives mentioned was to "[e]nsure that a high level
of Canadian goods and services is employed in oil and gas activities carried out on Canada Lands."'
Section 10(3) of Bill C-48,'" the implementing legislation, initially proposed that "[a]n exploration agreement shall require the
holder... to submit a plan satisfactory to the minister... for
the use of Canadian goods and services in carrying out [any] work
program.'

65

A later version of the bill, reprinted June 29, 1981,

responded to international criticism that Canada was contravening the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by altering the procurement provision so that the plan now provided
"Canadian manufacturers, consultants, contractors and service
158. Ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 27.
159.

See BUDGET PAPERS, supra note 6, at 87.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
See NEP, supra note 1, at 47.
Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.
Id. § 10(3).
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companies with a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis in the supply of goods and services used in that
work program." 166
Another objective of the NEP was to require fifty percent Canadian ownership for any oil or gas production from Canada

lands. Again, this objective is contained in Bill C-48.1 1 This situation also may be considered highly discriminatory because an initial licensee that is foreign-owned will be forced to enter a consortium to make the play at least fifty percent Canadian-

owned. 168
A final discriminatory aspect of the NEP is the preference
given to Canadian-owned firms in the allocation of gas export
permits. 169 This discriminatory provision was to be implemented
by including the following paragraph in section 83 of the National

Energy Board Act: "On an application for a license [to export oil
and gas],.., the Board shall... (c) have regard to the extent to

which Canadians participate or will participate in the production
of the gas to be exported."1

0

To date, no implementing legisla-

tion has been introduced.
2.

The United States and InternationalResponse

Shortly after the National Energy Program was announced, the
United States reacted to the NEP's allegedly discriminatory provisions in various ways.17 1 For instance, as early as November 7,
1980, Assistant Secretary of State Dean R. Hinton travelled to

Ottawa to present United States concerns about the NEP. On
166. Id. (reprinted as amended and reported June 29, 1981, by the Standing
Committee on National Resources and Public Works). This provision was enacted as such in the Canada Oil and Gas Act.
167. Id. § 19.
168. See infra notes 231-60 and accompanying text.
169. See NEP, supra note 1, at 50. "The National Energy Board will be
asked to take Canadian ownership levels into account, from now on, in considering export applications. The Government of Canada would prefer that in granting such licences, the Board would give preference to Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled firms." Id.
170. See Discussion Draft of the Energy Security Act, pt. 111 (1981) (released
by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources on June 6, 1981, proposing
amendments to the National Energy Board Act, CAN.REv. STAT., ch. N-6, cl. 69)
[hereinafter cited as Discussion Draft].
171. Some of the material referred to was made available by Mr. Peter
Lande, Energy Attach6 to the United States Embassy in Ottawa to whom the
author is indebted. See infra notes 172-76.
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March 11, 1981, United States Trade Representative William E.
Brock sent a letter to Canadian Industry Minister Herb Gray that
outlined United States concerns about the NEP. 171 The concerns

relating to discrimination fall into two categories: trade policy
and investment policy.
The letter of March 11, 1981, stated the United States position
that both the NEP and Bill C-48 (first reading) require "the use
of Canadian goods and services by oil and gas companies which
seek approval of operations on the 'Canada Lands' or in major
non-conventional oil projects ' 173 and that these "Buy Canada
conflict with the provisions of GATT Article
provisions ...
fI.' 11 74 The letter adds that the United States "intends to request

of Canada under the
formal consultations with the Government
17 5
provisions of GATT Article XXII:I.'

The letter of March 11, 1981, also stated that the Canadianization objectives of the NEP create discriminatory measures that
are a cause for concern "in the [f]ight of the [p]rinciple, of national treatment ... established as a goal by the 1976 OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Declaration and a related Decision which reaffirmed the principle in
1979. ' 1176 The United States Trade Representative probably was
alluding to the tax and incentive provision of the NEP in which
discriminatory PIP grants were to replace the nondiscriminatory
depletion allowances.
On March 13, 1981, at a meeting of the OECD Committee on
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the United States and
other OECD members expressed their concerns about Canada's
alleged violations of the national treatment provisions.1 77 These
172. Letter from William E. Brock (United States Trade Representative) to

Herb Gray (Canadian Industry Minister) (Mar. 11, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Brock Letter].
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Apparently, six states have registered complaints concerning Canada's

National Energy Policy with the OECD. The Globe & Mail (Toronto), Oct. 20,
1981, at B9. As far as the March 1981 meeting is concerned, it appears that

"seven OECD countries criticized the discriminatory aspects of the NEP and
voiced serious concern about its massive departure from the concept of national

treatment." Statement of the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(July 9, 1981) (before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the

House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce) [hereinafter
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reactions and others triggered a series of events that eventually
led to changes in the NEP. For instance, the procurement of
goods and services provisions of Bill C-48 178 were changed. Al-

though this measure brought expressions of satisfaction from the
United States Trade Representative,'" he continued to express
United States concerns about the fifty percent Canadian ownership requirement for production leases in Canada lands and the
replacement of depletion allowances with petroleum incentive
payments based upon levels of Canadian ownership.21°
A statement of the Office of the United States Trade Representative of July 9, 1981, explicitly set forth the United States posi" ' "In a national treatment sense, current Canadian investtion:18
ment policies, as reflected in

.

.

the National Energy Program

(NEP), are discriminatory in that U.S. and other foreign-owned
firms are treated less favorably than Canadian firms." The Deputy United States Trade Representative added that "the NEP [is
a] very serious derogation from the OECD's 1976 Declaration on
National Treatment, even taking into account the interpretative
statement made by the Canadians at the time of their initial
adoption of this Declaration."'

82

This position was reiterated on

September 22, 1981, by United States Under-Secretary of State
Rashish who stated: "Canadian Investment policies unjustly discriminate against U.S. and other foreign investors. These policies
clearly represent a major departure from the principle of 'National Treatment' ..

."183

B. International Commercial Law Principles and the NEP
1.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
signed originally in 1947 by twenty-three countries, including
cited as Trade Representative Statement].
178. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 10(3).
179. Letter from William E. Brock (United States Trade Representative) to
Peter M. Towe (Canadian Ambassador to the United States) in Washington,
D.C. (June 1, 1981).
180. Id. at 2.
181. See Trade Representative Statement, supra note 177.
182. See id. (opening statement of David R. McDonald).
183. Speech delivered to the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York
(Sept. 22, 1981).
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Canada,18 in order to eliminate, among other things, "discriminatory treatment in international commerce."1 85 GATT article III is
entitled "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation." Paragraph 4 states: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported .

..

shall be accorded treatment no

less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal... purchase... or use.""8 This paragraph is incompatible with the procurement provisions initially envisioned
in the NEP and contained in the first reading of Bill C-48.1817
These provisions were amended, however, as a result of United
States and international reaction; now, Canadians must have "a
full and fair opportunity to participate on a competitive basis in
the supply of goods and services." '88 It therefore could be argued
that the procurement provisions of Bill C-48 no longer conflict
with GATT. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are subject to
ministerial discretion, the provisions may contravene GATT.
Another country may require "consultation" with Canada
under article XXII of GATT if it believes conflict exists; this is
the first step in any international legal proceeding.1 89 The next
step would be an action under article XXIII of GATT whereby
written representations are made to Canada. If the matter is not
resolved, it would be referred to the contracting parties. 190 While
the decision of the latter appears to be binding, it is
unenforceable.
2.

The OECD Declarationon National Treatment

The OECD was established by a convention signed in Paris on
December 14, 1960. The signatories agreed "to contribute to the
expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory
basis in accordance with international obligations."1 91 Canada is a
184. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
185. Id. 61 Stat. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
186. Id. art. H, 61 Stat. 18, T.LA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204.
187. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1981-1982 Can. Stat. § 10(3) (first reading, Dec. 9, 1980).
188. Id. (rev. June 29, 1981).
189. See GATT, supra note 184, art. XX, 61 Stat., T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. at 266.
190. Id. art. XXII, 61 Stat., T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 266.
191. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
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member of the OECD.
On June 21, 1976, the Committee on Foreign Investment and
Multinational Corporations of the OECD adopted a Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 192 accompanied by an annex entitled "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises" that favors "national treatment." The Declaration
provides that "Member countries should .. . accord to enterprises ... owned or controlled. . . by nationals of another Member country ... treatment under their laws, regulations and ad-

ministrative practices, consistent with international law and no
less favorable than accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises ... ."193 Although this Declaration does not bind member

countries, a binding decision on national treatment was issued on
the same date by an OECD Council 94 which required that
"[m]easures taken by a Member country constituting exceptions
to 'National Treatment'
Organisation . ..15

...

shall

be

notified

to

the

Under this notification procedure, member countries advise the
OECD about their respective exceptions to the national treatment rules. The resulting study of national treatment, published
in 1978, is very interesting. 196 This study contains a list of derogations from the principle of national treatment by member countries. For instance, a relatively long list of United States derogations from this principle appears in the report." Together with
most other member countries, the United States and Canada discriminate against foreign companies in a number of ways. For example, "[floreign-controlled enterprises operating in the United
States may not: (1) hold in aggregate more than 20 percent of the
opment, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 1(c), 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S.
179.
192. OECD Committee on Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations, Declarationon InternationalInvestment and Multinational Enterprises,
OECD Press Release A(76)(20) (June 21, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967
(1976).
193. Id. art. I1,reprinted at 968; see generally Plaine, The OECD Guidelines for MultinationalEnterprises, 11 INT'L LAw. 339 (1977).
194. OECD, Decision of the Council on National Treatment, reprintedin 15
I.L.M. 978 (1976).
195. Id. at 979.
196.

OECD,

ESTABLISHED IN

NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES

OECD CouNrrums (1978).

197. Id. at 57-59.
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shares of stock of the Communications Satellite Corporation;...
(4) engage in operations involving the utilisation or production of
atomic energy;. . . [or] (8) acquire a controlling interest in a telegraph company ....
,"1,l This list is by no means exhaustive and
the federal
government
of Canada most certainly is happy to add
to it. 199
Of course, Canada and other countries had their own lists of
derogations. Perhaps a case could be made that a country which
derogates from the national treatment principle should refrain
from expressing outrage at another country's derogations from
the same principle. The question that must be addressed is
whether the NEP respects the OECD national treatment principle, notwithstanding the argument that other countries are acting
in identical ways.
A cursory look at the NEP readily provides a negative answer.
The size of the petroleum incentive payments grants for which an
entity is eligible is keyed to the degree of Canadian ownership
and control.20 0 Production licenses will be granted only to oil
plays with a fifty percent Canadian ownership. 20 1 Natural gas export permits will be granted by the National Energy Board on the
basis of the producer's status as a Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled firm.2 2 Presumably, these derogations from the
national treatment principle will eventually be notified by Canada to the OECD under the latter's binding 1976 Decision.20
The 1976 Declaration and its related 1976 Decision were reviewed in 1979 by the OECD Committee on National Investment
and Multinational Enterprises.2" An OECD Council decision on

198. Id. at 58-59.
199. See, e.g., Notes for a speech by Canadian Ambassador Towe to the
American Gas Association, at 12 (Oct. 13, 1981) (New York). The speaker referred to the United States Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered

sections of 30 U.S.C.), and to United States laws relating to maritime transport,
banking, and broadcasting industries. Id.
200. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (PIP payments table).
201. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 19.
202. See NEP, supra note 1, at 50 ("The National Energy Board will be
asked to take Canadian ownership levels into account ... in considering export
applications."). But see Discussion Draft, supra note 170.
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
204. OECD, Report of the Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises on the Review of the 1976 Declarationand Decisions, OECD Doc. C(79) 102 (Final) (June 5, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 986
(1979).
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national treatment was reached on June 13, 1979,205 under which

member countries were required to notify OECD of new derogations from the national treatment principle within thirty days.0 6
Apparently, Canada did not notify the OECD in the month following publication of the NEP. Whether Canada is at fault here
is open to question because the measures taken did not become
law until enabling legislation was passed; in some cases this occurred as late as September 1982. Nevertheless, the NEP technically breaches Canada's international commitments with the
OECD because it discriminates against foreign firms.
A final problem must be examined. In 1976, the Canadian federal government made the following interpretative statement
when it assented to the 1976 Declaration: "Canada will continue
to retain its right to take measures, affecting foreign investors,
which we believe are necessary, given our particular circumstances. 20 7 The effectiveness of this interpretative statement has
been challenged by the United States in the following manner:
"Notwithstanding Canada's interpretative statement in the
OECD, the United States Government had understood that Canada through its continuing participation in relevant OECD exercises, maintained a fundamental commitment to national treatment and its extension over time.

' 20

Canada may claim "special

circumstances" and the United States justifiably could use the
term "violation" to describe the NEP's derogations from the national treatment principle. Both are correct from their own perspectives. Unfortunately, no international legal procedure for
resolving such differences exists. The only recourse would be to
consultations under the Declaration and its annex, but these are
more political than legal in nature.
3.

The InternationalEnergy Agency, Oil Prices, and the NEP

As oil prices have risen in the past decade, so has international
concern about them. Various fora have tackled the problem of
205. OECD, Revised Decision of the Council on National Treatment
(adopted June 13, 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1173 (1979).
206. Id. art. 3, reprinted at 1174.
207. See Notes for a statement made by the Secretary of State for External
Affairs 2 (June 21, 1976) (OECD Ministerial Meeting) [hereinafter cited as

Notes]. A similar interpretative statement was made by Canada in 1979 when
the OECD reviewed its Declaration and Decision on National Treatment.

208. See Brock Letter, supra note 171.
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higher oil and gas prices and have adopted or suggested remedies.
For its part, Canada was a party to declarations made at the 1979
Tokyo Economic Summit and the 1980 Venice Economic Summit.
It also is a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA),
which addressed the problem both in 1976 and 1977 and continues to monitor energy prices.
a.

The IEA and Canada's commitments

The IEA was established in November of 1974 within the
framework of the OECD to implement an international energy
program. 2 09 The Agency was established to promote cooperation
among its members, to reduce excessive dependence on oil, and to
develop a stable international energy trade through cooperation
between oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.2 10
In 1976, the IEA established a program for long-term cooperation on energy. 211 Chapter V of the agreement provides that participating countries shall "refrain from introducing legislation or
administrative regulations in the energy field which would prevent them from affording the nationals of other Participating
Countries treatment no less favourable than that afforded to their
own nationals.121 2 In other words, the parties agreed to refrain
from introducing legislation that would have the effect of discriminating against foreign firms. This chapter of the agreement, however, does not appear to be binding on Canada because Canada
did not commit itself to this nondiscrimination provision. 213
In October 1977, the IEA adopted its "Principles for Energy
Policy,"21 4 article 3 of which allows "domestic energy prices to

209. OECD,Council Decision Establishing an InternationalEnergy Agency
of the Organisation,OECD Doc. C(74) 203 (Final) (Nov. 18, 1974), reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 789 (1975).
210. Agreement on an International Energy Program, Nov. 18, 1974, 27
U.S.T. 1685, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1 (1975).
211. Long-Term Co-Operation Programme, Jan. 30, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 231,
T.I.A.S. No. 8229, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 249 (1976).
212. Id. at ch. V, 27 U.S.T. at 245, T.I.A.S. No. 8229 at 14, reprinted in 15
I.L.M. at 262.
213. The Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974, ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can.
Stat. prevented Canada from agreeing to chapter V. See Notes, supra note 207,
at 2.
214. International Energy Agency, Principles for Energy Policy (1977), reprinted in ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF IEA COUNTRIES, 1980 REVIEW
329 (1981).
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reach a level which encourages energy conservation and development of alternative sources of energy."2 15 The IEA mentions the
pricing proposals of the NEP in its 1980 Annual Review: "The
Canadian price path for oil and gas is much lower than would be
in accordance with IEA and Summit decisions, which have repeatedly drawn attention to the importance of keeping oil prices
at world levels or moving to them as quickly as possible."21 It
adds that Canada should "take steps to increase domestic oil
prices to world market levels."21 7
b. Canada's commitments under the economic summits
At the June 1979 economic summit in Tokyo, the participating
countries 218 committed themselves to a uniform energy policy. 19
Under the Tokyo Declaration, the participating countries agreed:
on the importance of keeping domestic oil prices at world market
prices or raising them to this level as soon as possible . . . [and

sought] to minimize and finally eliminate administrative action
that might put upward pressure on oil prices that result from domestic underpricing of0oil and to avoid new subsidies which would
2
have the same effect.2

The Venice Economic Summit Declaration was more precise.22 1

The parties to this summit agreed that "maximum reliance
should be placed on the price mechanism and domestic prices for
oil should take into account representative world prices." 222 Canada signed this Declaration.
c. The establishment of a blended price in Canada
As of October 28, 1980, the National Energy Program estab215. Id.
216.

ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF

IEA COUNTRIES, 1980 REVIEW

124

(1981).
217. Id. at 127.
218. The following countries participated in the summit: Canada, the United
States, France, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of
Germany. President Carter Attends Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo, 79
DEP'T ST. BULL. 1, 8-9 (Declaration of June 29, 1979, is reproduced).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 8.
221. President Carter Attends Economic Summit in Venice, 80 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 1, 8-11 (Declaration of June 23, 1980, is reproduced).
222. Id. at 9.
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lished a new schedule of prices for domestically produced oil
along with a new price system intended to "blend the costs of
different sources of oil into one weighted-average price to consumers." 228 The federal government refused to link Canadian and
world energy prices, but endeavored to establish a so-called
"made in Canada" price that would blend higher cost imported
oil with lower cost domestic oil. In no case would the blended
price exceed eighty-five percent of the international price or the
average price of oil in the United States, whichever was lower.2 2
On September 1, 1981, after many months of bickering, the federal government and the Government of Alberta reached an
agreement on a new price schedule. 225 The bil prices agreed upon
are substantially higher than those proposed in October 1980.
Under the agreement, oil prices will go up periodically with a ceiling of seventy-five percent of the world price for old ol226 and of
100 percent of the world price for new oil.
d. The legal situation
Although the decision to keep domestic prices below world
market prices appears to contravene Canada's commitments at
the 1979 and 1980 economic summit meetings as well as section 3
of the IEA's 1977 Principlesfor Energy Policy, little or no legal
recourse against Canada is available.
The letter of March 11, 1981, from Trade Representative
Brock to the Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 227 referred to the lEA and the Venice Summit and stated
that "decisions have been made which emphasize the importance
of keeping oil prices at world levels or moving toward prices at
world levels as quickly as possible.

'228

The letter added that the

United States shared "the view expressed at the EA's recent
meeting that the NEP's price path is much lower than that dictated by both lEA and Summit decisions.

' 229

The letter added

that artificial Canadian prices give producers in Canada a com223. See NEP, supra note 1, at 25.
224. Id. at 30.
225. See Canada-Alberta Agreement, supra note 11, at 1-7.
226. Id. at 1.
227. See Brock letter, supra note 171, at 4. This concern was reiterated in
Mr. Brock's letter to Canadian Ambassador Towe on June 1, 1981.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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petitive advantage over their United States counterparts and that
Canada is thus "free to allow its producers to export low priced
Canadian resources in the form of low priced manufactured
goods." 230 But Canada's commitments stem from "soft" international law. A breach of "soft" international law merely decreases
the credibility of the country involved.
So far as international trade is concerned, the main drawback
of the Canadian position is the ability of Canadian nationals to
compete unjustly with foreign competitors because artificially low
oil costs reduce the price of Canadian-produced goods. The pricing agreement of September 1, 1981, diminishes the effects of the
differential, however, and it appears doubtful that a strong case
now could be made against Canada on this matter. Nevertheless,
it can be said that the Canadian federal government has not
abided by its international commitments regarding oil pricing.
C. "Confiscatory" Provisions in the NEP
1.

The Twenty-five Percent Back-in

Some of the most bitter reactions to the National Energy Program related to the proposal to "[r]eserve to the Crown a 25 per
cent interest in every right on Canada Lands. This interest...
[is] in the form of a carried interest, convertible to a working interest .... It [applies] to all existing interests, however ac-

quired." 23' This proposal brought an immediate outcry from the
oil industry, which called it "confiscation" and "expropriation
without compensation.

' 23 2

The reserve has come to be known as

the twenty-five percent back-in and has been defined appropriately by D.G. Crosby at a hearing of the committee of Parliament

230. Id.

231. See NEP, supra note 1, at 47. The 25% back-in has been enacted in
Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 27.
232. Submissions forwarded by the industry before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works in 1981, reprinted in Minutes and Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee
on National Resources and Public Works, No. 39, at 39A:6 (Mar. 19, 1981)
(Chevron Canada, Ltd.); see also id. No. 40, at 2 (Mar. 26, 1981) (Canadian
Petroleum Association); No. 32, at 2 (Mar. 4, 1981) (Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd.).

But see id. No. 23, at 10 (wherein Professor Rowland J. Harrison states that the
25% back-in is not necessarily confiscatory and that the question is not only

legal but also political).
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studying Bill C-48, the proposed Canada Oil and Gas Act,233 as

follows: "Back-in is a shorthand way of saying that all of the interest holders have to move over proportionately to make room
23 4
for the party coming in.,,
The original Bill C-48 contained the following provisions on
this matter:
Her Majesty ... is hereby vested with ... a twenty-five per cent

share
(a) in any interest provided under this Act in respect of lands that
were Crown reserve lands immediately prior to the provision of
this interest; and
(b) in the first interest provided in respect of the relevant Canada
lands by any of sections 63, 64 or 66 [which relate to former permits and leases].2 5
No Crown share vests in respect of a former lease under which oil
or gas was first produced... on or before January 1, 1976 .... 231

The interests and rights provided by this Act replace all oil and gas
interests and rights... acquired or vested in relation
to Canada
2 37
lands prior to the coming into force of this Act.

These proposals were fair game to the extent they were applied
prospectively. The retroactive provisions were not, and both Canadian industry and the United States Government complained
vehemently.
Suprisingly, no provision for compensation was contained in
the original version of Bill C-48. Although legally defensible,238 it
was politically unwise and the federal government later was
233. Ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.
234. See Debates of the House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, No. 17, at 19 (Jan. 21, 1981).
235. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 27(2) (first reading, Dec. 9, 1980).
236. Id. § 28.
237. Id. § 61(1).
238. "The prohibition 'Thou shall not steal' has no legal force upon a sovereign body. And there would be no necessity for compensation to be given." Florence Mining Co. v. Cobalt Lake Mining Co., 18 Ont. L. R. 275, 279 (Ct. App.
1908) (Riddell, J.). Regarding compensation, see Manitoba Fisheries, Ltd. v. The
Queen, 1979 S.C.R. 101 (Can.) (canvasses Canadian domestic law where compensation for the taking of goodwill was allowed following the closing of a fishery).
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obliged to retreat. 39
2.

United States and Industry Reaction

The United States Trade Representative's letter of March 11,
1981,140 mentions that the provisions which "retroactively reserve
a 25 per cent interest to the Government of Canada. . .and prohibit the licensing ... for development without 50 per cent Canadian ownership, raise potentially serious issues concerning Canada's obligations under mutually recognized international law and
practice with respect to direct and indirect expropriation and
compensation. '24 1 This reaction brought a change in Bill C-48 242
that authorized so-called ex-gratia payments of twenty-five percent of qualified expenditures made before 1981.243 This measure
was considered insufficient by the United States Trade Representative because "the announced approach may not take full account of the true commercial value of the assets involved .... -,4
In July 1981, the Trade Representative added that this particular
provision of the NEP "retains, in our view, its expropriatory
24 5
nature."
3.

The CanadianFederal Government Response

The federal government responded to the United- States reaction to the twenty-five percent back-in by saying that there was
no expropriation at all. According to the Canadian Ambassador to
the United States, 4 6 the provision creates only a "Crown Inter239. See Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat.
240. See Brock Letter, supra note 171.
241. Id.
242. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 29(2).
243. Id.; see also Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, reprinted in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Resources and
Public Works, No. 49, at 20 (May 14, 1981) (Federal Energy Minister Marc
Lalonde).
244. Letter from William E. Brock (United States Trade Representative) to
Peter M. Towe (Canadian Ambassador to the United States) (June 1, 1981).
245. Impact of CanadianInvestment and Energy Policieson United States
Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversights and Investigations
and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,and Finance
of Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1981) (statement
of the office of the United States Trade Representative).
246. Speech by Peter M. Towe (Canadian Ambassador to the United States)
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est" and takes account of several factors: federal government
ownership of the lands; the inclusion of incentive payments in the
package of which the provision is but one part; the new world
energy environment; reform of the previously entrenched land
reservation concept; the twenty-five percent Crown incentive payments of exploration costs to all firms exploring in Canada lands;
and the absence of discrimination between foreign and Canadiancontrolled firms. Moreover, the twenty-five percent carried interin effect
est is incurred before production; therefore the Crown247
pays its share of the subsequent development expenses.
This explains why the amendments to the twenty-five percent
retroactive back-in provisions of Bill C-48, which was changed
under heavy United States and industry pressure, do not provide
for compensation, but rather authorize twenty-five percent exgratiapayments of exploration expenditures incurred before 1981
if significant discoveries are made before 1983.248 No payments
are to be made for dry holes, which supports the argument that
no compensation is required for the back-in. Payments will be
made from the Crown's share of future production.2 9
4. InternationalLaw Aspects
Whether or not the NEP and its implementing legislation contain expropriating measures remains a subject of considerable disagreement. A decision that these measures-such as the twentyfive percent back-in-are confiscatory would raise the question
whether they are consistent with international law when applied
to foreign-owned or controlled firms. In the case of domestic
firms, domestic law would prevail. For foreign firms, there is considerable confusion about the state of the law.2 50
According to a 1962 United Nations resolution, "[n]ationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds of public utility, security or the national interest ....

In

such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensato American Gas Ass'n in New York City, at 7 (Oct. 13, 1981).
247. Id. at 7-9.
248. Canada Oil and Gas Act, ch. 81, 1980-1982 Can. Stat. § 29.
249. Id. § 29(3).
250. For a comprehensive study of the situation, see Mendes, The Canadian
National Energy Program:An Example of Assertion of Economic Sovereignty
or CreepingExpropriationin InternationalLaw, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 475
(1981).
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tion ....

,,251 The United Nations passed numerous other resolutions on the same subject. 252 Among these, a 1973 resolution men-

tions that "application of the principle of nationalization . ,
implies that each State is entitled to determine the amount of
possible compensation.

2 53

A 1974 resolution also required appro-

priate compensation for expropriation after "taking into account
.. . relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the
state considers relevant."25 4 But these United Nations resolutions
are not binding because they are not seen "as a source of international law or as legally binding precedents on the member nations.

' 255

Moreover, the United States generally, has not sup-

ported these resolutions. In fact, the twenty-five percent back-in
may comply with the language of Resolution 3281256 because previous tax incentives and exploration grants to foreign firms would
be among the "circumstances" to consider.
The United States position is quite different from the stance
taken by the United Nations because the United States favors
prompt payment of compensation. 57 United States law authorizes
retaliatory measures when expropriation occurs against its individual or corporate citizens.258
Despite its appearance, the twenty-five percent back-in is not
necessarily confiscatory, especially when given the federal government's perception of the situation. 25 9" Nevertheless, as an oil in-

dustry representative once stated: "[I]t does constitute a frustration of those legitimate expectations on which prior investment
' 260
decisions have been made.

251. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Plenary (Agenda Item 62), U.N. Doc. A/
5344/Add. 1, AlL. 412/Rev. 2 (1962).
252. See Mendes, supra note 250, at 487-91.

253. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52,.U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
254. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974).

255.
256.
257.
258.

See Mendes, supra note 250, at 492.
See supra note 254.
Id. at 494-95.
See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976 & Supp. V

1981).
259. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee
on National Resources and Public Works, No. 23, at 36-38 (1981) (statement by
Mr. Rowland J. Harrison before the House of Commons Committee that studied

Bill C-48).
260. D. MacFarlane, Notes on Energy Resources and International Rela-
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Whether the measure is expropriatory in nature or not, there
appears to be no recourse under international law for nondiscriminatory expropriation. Rather, it seems that any recourse must be
political, and could be accomplished through national
governments.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would appear from the foregoing discussion that international legal responses to the various taxation and Canadianization
measures of the Canadian National Energy Program are rather
limited. Neither the OECD, the lEA, nor the United Nations is
an effective forum for airing complaints about the lack of national
treatment, the low energy prices, or the inadequate compensation
for confiscatory government actions. Pronouncements by these organizations remain "soft" and nonbinding international law. On
the other hand, legal recourse could conceivably exist under the
GATT rules. Even with the recent changes, the NEP still may
contravene GATT. The GATT rules appear to provide the only
practical forum for international litigation in this area.26 1 Therefore, any international proceeding by the United States would
have to be based on a GATT violation. The NEP's most obvious
contravention of GATT (the procurement provisions of Bill C-48)
has been modified by the federal Parliament and now is not as
vulnerable to attack. Finally, the absence of national treatment in
internal taxation contravenes the OECD Code rather than GATT
and recourse under the former would be based on soft law.
A complaint against the NEP conceivably could be made on the
ground that discriminatory subsidies to be paid under the PIP
program violate GATT. Whether this type of international legal
recourse exists is uncertain. Furthermore, whether the United
States or any nation may present a case specifically on behalf of
its nationals is also open to question. 6 2

tions, at 30 (Oct. 30, 1981) (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Cana-

dian Council on International Law in Ottawa).
261. The United States Government has already initiated consultations on
FIRA under the provisions of GATT article XXII as of February 17, 1982. See
Hormats, supra note 14, at 53. The Government is also envisioning the possibility of initiating a case against the NEP "if it is implemented in ways which are

contrary to Canada's GATT obligations." Id. at 54.
262.

See Saunders & Gault, The National Energy Program and the Pursuit

of Claims under InternationalLaw, REsouRcEs, May 1982, at 1 (newsletter of
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A look at the essential facts of the NEP reveals that the whole
scheme should be labelled "Ottawa-ization" instead of Canadianization for two reasons. First, the NEP favors exploration on
Canada lands over exploration on provincial lands. Second, the
increased federal revenue share from oil and gas production
comes at the expense of provincial and oil industry shares. The
agreement of September 1, 1981, between the Government of Alberta and the federal government is but another episode in the
struggle between Ottawa and the provinces for revenues and for a
restatement of Canadian federalism. With the support of Qu6bec,
the producing provinces have stressed the sovereignty of federated states over natural resources, and have argued that the Canadian provinces are autonomous in their own fields of jurisdiction. The federal government takes a totally different view of the
relationship. It believes that the central government is somewhat
superior to the provincial governments which, under this viewpoint, are less important local governments. This perceived "bigfoot" approach in energy matters has offended the federated
states by impeding their efforts to profit from their natural resources. Perhaps realizing the inadequacy of its approach, the
federal government finally has arrived at agreements with the
producing provinces. This has left the oil corporations-especially
the international corporations-with little or no advantage and
reduced cash flows.
Political will is not necessarily economically attractive, as far as
private investment decisions are concerned. Nevertheless, when
this political will is translated into legislation, it changes the law
of the land which everyone must follow. Foreign nationals may
fall victim to injustice, but this is a risk attendant to investing in
another country. The NEP may be objectionable; it even may be
illegitimate. In the absence of a world legal order, however, it remains legal. In transnational law, neither reason nor cash-flow
problems count. Enforceable law counts. Notwithstanding its motives, the bulk of the NEP remains valid Canadian law.
the Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Calgary). The authors quite appropriately refer to Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment), when they mention the case of Canadian subsidiaries of
United States multinational oil corporations. Because these subsidiaries are incorporated in Canada and presumably have accepted Canadian jurisdiction, an
argument could be made that it would be highly inappropriate for them to have
a foreign state pursue a case on their behalf. Indeed, a preliminary objection by
Canada could then be made.
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It is understandable that perceived discriminatory measures are
disfavored because non-Canadian owned or controlled companies
are inconvenienced and frustrated. Nevertheless, these measures
are an expression of Canadian political will. Whether, as others
would see it, this philosophy eventually will be replaced by wisdom and reason remains to be seen. The answer will unfold as
currents of political activity impact on Canada's energy policy.

